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COMMENTS
The Bill of Particulars in Criminal Trials-
Judicial Discretion
Under both the United States' and the Louisiana2 Constitu-
tions, the defendant in a criminal trial is given the right to, be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In order to implement this basic right, the Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedure provides in Articles.2538 and 2884 that in the
discretion of the trial judge the district attorney may be required
to furnish the defendant a bill of particulars setting out more
specifically the nature of the offense charged. This discretion is
not entirely unlimited, however, and where there is manifest
error and a showing of prejudice to the defendant the trial judge
will be reversed.5 It is the purpose here to set forth the vari-
ous limitations upon this discretion of the trial judge and their
applications in practice.
In determining the limits of the trial judge's discretion it is
necessary to keep in mind the underlying function of a bill of
particulars, namely, to inform the defendant of the nature of
the accusations against him.6 This principle has been expressed
in a number of ways. For instance, in State v. Selsor7 the Loui-
siana Supreme Court stated that "The accused is entitled of
right to be informed of the facts necessary to enable him to pre-
pare his defense." 8 There the court cited with approval State v.
Clark,9 in which it was said that the state must furnish particu-
lars where it "would be so easy as in this case, and so conducive
to the fairness of the trial." "D In State v. Mines" the court
1. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 10.
3. This article provides, "Provided further that the district attorney, if
requested by the accused prior to "arraignment, may be required by the judge
to furnish a bill of particulars setting up more specifically the nature of the
offense charged."
4. Article 288 provides, "Defects in indictments can be urged before
verdict only by demurrer or a motion to quash, and the accused is not entitled
to any bill of particulars as to the subject matter charged in the indictment,
but the trial judge may in his discretion, require the district attorney to file
in the case such data as, in the opinion of the judge, may be sufficient."
5. State v. Buhler, 132 La. 1065, 62 So. 145 (1913); State v. Sheffield, 201
La. 1055, 10 So. 2d 894 (1942); State v. Augusta, 199 La. 896, 7 So. 2d 177
(1942); State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948).
6. State v. Ezell, 189 La. 151, 179 So. 64 (1934); State v. Varnado, 208 La.
319, 23 So. 2d 106 (1945); Comment, 6 LoUIsiANA LAW REVIEW 461 (1945).
7. 127 La. 513, 53 So. 737 (1910).
8. 127 La. 513, 515, 53 So. 737.
9. 124 La. 965, 50 So. 811 (1909).
10. 124 La. 965, 967, 50 So. 811, 812.
11. 137 La. 489, 68 So. 837 (1915).
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expressed the view that particulars should be furnished as a
matter of fairness and to put the defendant on his guard as to
what offense he was charged with. In State v. DeArman 2 the
court held that the defendant should be given certain particulars
"in order that he may be prepared to meet or rebut the proof
submitted by the State." 13
In all of the foregoing cases it should be noted that the crime
charged was in the nature of unlawfully selling or possessing
intoxicating liquors. Such a crime is of a recurring type, that is,
it may take place at many different times, in many different
places, and in numerous ways.1 4 The indictment or information
charging such a crime, even when following the long form of
indictment, is usually general and does not set out how or when
the crime was committed. Since the defendant has probably
repeated the unlawful act over a considerable period of time
and has sold liquor to a number of different persons, when he is
arrested and charged it could be for any number of the criminal
acts. It seems apparent that in order to inform the defendant
adequately of the nature and cause of the crime charged, it is
necessary to inform him of the particular sale or possession for
which he is being prosecuted. Thus, it has been held reversible
error for the trial judge to refuse a bill of particulars when the
indictment or information does not furnish enough information
to put the accused on his guard as to the particular offense
charged. 15
The converse of this recurring crime situation was presented
in State v. Goodson16 and State v. Augusta. 7 In both of these
cases the defendant was charged with murder, an act which is
specific and to which there could be no possible mistake as to
the particular act charged against the defendant. In State v.
Augusta the court said, "Where the'nature of the crime is such
that it could only be committed in one place and by one act,
which creates a status making the corpus delicti easy of proof,
12. 153 La. 345, 95 So. 803 (1923).
13. 153 La. 345, 347, 95 So. 803, 804.
14. Other crimes which have this recurring element are carnal knowledge
of a juvenile (State v. Larocca, 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 [1924]) and embezzle-
ment (Clark, Criminal Procedure § 151 [2 ed. 1918]). Louisiana no longer has
a statute specifically charging embezzlement, but the same rule should apply
under the general theft article, Art. 67, La. Crim. Code of 1942, La. R.S. (1950)
14:67.
15. Clark, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 151; State v. Maloney, 115 La. 496,
39 So. 539 (1905); State v. Rollins, 153 La. 10, 95 So. 264 (1922); State v.
Larocca, 156 La. 567, 100 So. 720 (1924).
16. 116 La. 388, 40 So. 771 (1906).
17. 199 La. 896, 7 So. 2d 177 (1942).
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the uniform trend of opinion is that it is wholly sufficient to
charge the accused in the language of the statute and that he
needs no information to put him on his guard in the preparation
of his defense." 18
It would seem, however, that even in cases where "the nature
of the crime is such that it could only be committed in one place
and by one act," if the defendant is planning to rely on an
alibi, he can force the state to give the date of the alleged crime.
Where the short form indictment 19 is used it was held in
several recent Louisiana cases that the defendant is entitled of
right to a bill of particulars. 20 In State v. Bessar,2 1 State v.
Masino,2 2 and State v. Leming23 the charge was for murder under
the short form indictment, and the supreme court adopted the
ruling that any time the short form indictment is used the defen-
dant is entitled of right to a bill of particulars setting out the
nature and cause of the crime. Here we should note briefly the
case of State v. Augusta 24 In that case the defendant was
indicted under the short form of Article 235, and the supreme
court upheld the trial judge in refusing the bill of particulars.
The decision was posited on the ground that the act charged
was a specific act and that the defendant knew of what crime
he was being charged. Since the Bessar, Masino, and Leming
cases are of a later date than the Augusta case it may safely be
said that the Augusta case has been impliedly overruled and
that the rule denying a bill of particulars where the indictment
charges a non-recurring crime must be limited to cases involving
the long form indictment.
It should be noted, however, that even where the defendant
is found to be entitled to a bill of particulars, whether in connec-
tion with a short or long form indictment, there are certain prac-
tical limits as to what he can demand. One of the most impor-
tant of these restrictions on the information which can be de-
manded is that the defense cannot force the state to disclose its
evidence in advance of trial.25 This rule had been held to apply
18. 199 La. 896, 903, 7 So. 2d 177, 180.
19. As provided for in Art. 235, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, La. R.S.
(1950) 14:235.
20. State v. Bessar, 213 La. 299, 34 So. 2d 785 (1948)1; State v. Masino, 214
La. 744, 38 So. 2d 622 (1949); State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262 (1950).
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. 199 La. 896, 7 So. 2d 177 (1942).
25. State v. Fernandez, 157,La. 149, 102 So. 186 (1924); State v. Lee, 173
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where the defendant requested the time of day and manner in
which the alleged crime was committed, in a charge of robbery;2
and the place and circumstances surrounding a charged conspir-
acy to commit robbery. 27 In a charge of attempted simple kid-
napping this rule was employed when the defendant requested
particulars as to the place where the offense occurred, the manner
in which the parties or either of them attempted to seize the
prosecutrix, the means or mode by which they or either of them
attempted to carry her, the part taken by each defendant in
the perpetration of the alleged offense, and the steps taken by
each or either to effect the attempt.28 The holdings in the above
cases are not in contravention of the purpose of the bill of par-
ticulars, for the requested information was not necessary to place
the defendant on his guard as to the offense charged. However,
there seem to be no specific criteria as to what information or
evidence is necessary to inform the accused properly of the crime
charged; this matter is entirely dependent on the attitude of the
trial judge as to whether the requested particulars are necessary
for the proper defense of the accused. 29
The case of State v. Iseringhausen° illustrates another limi-
tation on the permissible scope of the bill of particulars, that is,
the defense cannot force the state to choose in advance between
responsive verdicts. There the defense requested that the state
inform it as to whether the killing was intentional or the result
of negligence, and if intentional, the type of intent present. The
supreme court said, "It would appear from the motion for a bill
of particulars that counsel for the defendant was endeavoring
to place the State in the position of abandoning either one or the
other of the responsive verdicts that might be rendered under
the charge. Under the charge of manslaughter, a verdict of
manslaughter, or a verdict of negligent homicide is responsive.
A defendant charged in an indictment or information with a
crime but convicted of a lesser crime is sufficiently informed of
La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932); State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948). In
State v. Leming, 217 La. 257, 46 So. 2d 262 (1950), the supreme court adopted
the trial court's opinion to the effect that even where a short form indictment
was used, the state could not be forced to furnish the defendant with all of
the state's evidence.
26. State v. Lee, 173 La. 966, 139 So. 302 (1932).
27. State v. Fernandez, 157 La. 149, 102 So. 186 (1924).
28. State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So. 2d 359 (1948).
29. No case was discovered where a trial judge was reversed for the
reason that he should have forced the state to disclose the requested
evidence.
30. 204 La. 593, 16 So. 2d 65 (1943).
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the nature of the accusation against him when the major crime
has been properly alleged in the indictment." 31
Only facts and not legal conclusions need be given in a bill
of particulars. This was brought out in State v. Rollins," in
which the defendant asked to be informed of the type of posses-
sion he was charged with under an information for unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquors. The court said that this request
"merely calls for a conclusion of law. Accused was only entitled
to know the facts to be relied upon, and it would then become
the duty of the court to determine the legal consequences of the
facts so alleged or proven, as the case might be." 3
The defendant has also, been refused particulars where they
would be useless and would not aid him in preparing his defense
because of their immateriality. Such was the case in State v.
Alford,3 4 where the defendant was charged with carnal knowl-
edge of a juvenile and sought specific information as to whether
the offense occurred at night or in the daytime. Since this infor-
mation would have no bearing on the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, the court concluded that the particulars would not be of
any assistance to the defendant and refused to require the state
to furnish the information. In State v. Cox 3 5 the defendant asked
to be informed of the hour of the sale of intoxicating liquors
charged against him; the court refused, saying that it is not
an essential element of the offense charged that it be committed
at a particular hour.
The courts have consistently recognized the inevitable rule
that the state does not have to furnish particulars when such
particulars are not available. This rule was first announced in
State v. Clark.36 The trial judge had stated that there might be a
situation where the state could not give any particulars because
it did not have any. While the supreme court failed to affirm the
trial -judge's refusal to require the bill of particulars in the
instant case, it did recognize that a situation might exist where
the state had no further information to offer and in such a case
the state would be excused from furnishing the requested par-
31. 204 La. 593, 606, 16 So. 2d 65, 69. Since La. Act 161 of 1948, the quoted
statement is no longer correct insofar as it states that the crime of negligent
homicide is responsive to the charge of manslaughter.
32. 153 La. 10, 95 So. 264 (1922).
33. 153 La. 10, 13, 95 So. 264, 266.
34. 206 La. 100, 18 So. 2d 666 (1944).
35. 167 La. 277, 119 So. 48 (1928).
36. 124 La. 965, 50 So. 811 (1909).
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ticulars. In State v. Gould37 the supreme court upheld a trial
court's refusal to grant particulars after the prosecutor had
informed the court that he was not in a position to furnish the
particulars because of the manner in which the books had been
kept by the defendant.
CONCLUSIONS
Generalizations are misleading in an area of law so depen-
dent upon the discretion of the trial judge as he views the facts
and circumstances of the individual case. However, certain broad
propositions emerge from a multitude of cases. First, when the
long form indictment or information is employed, the defendant
is entitled to such additional particulars as are necessary to
apprise him of the charge against him so that he may adequately
prepare his defense. Second, in the case of the short form indict-
ment the defendant has a general right to a bill of particulars,
but this right is subject to certain very practical limitations. The
bill of particulars cannot be used to force the state to disclose
specific evidence, or to abandon a responsive verdict. Neither
can it be used as a dilatory tactic by requiring an enumeration
of useless particulars or of conclusions of law. Finally, the state
cannot be expected to perform the impossible, that is, to furnish
particulars it does not have.
James A. Hobbs
Labor Law-Applicability of United States
Arbitration Act' to Collective
Bargaining Agreements
Since the recent decision of the United States Cohrt of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Motor Coach Employees v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,2 quickly followed by Pennsyl-
vania Greyhound Lines v. Motor Coach Employees,3 a different
37. 155 La. 639, 99 So. 490 (1924).
1. 43 Stat. 883, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1925).
2. 192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951).
3. 193 F. 2d 327 (3rd Cir. 1952). Plaintiff employer brought suit against
defendant union for breach of no strike agreement. The district court had
granted a stay of proceedings pending arbitration according to the collective
bargaining agreement. The third circuit reversed the order and remanded
the case in order that it might be proceeded with. It merely affirmed its
position taken in Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
192 F. 2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951),
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